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In response to Carrie Menkel-Meadow's challenge to articulate and define a
general theory of conflict management that is universally applicable regardless of
context or domain,' the following General Theory and methodologies are put
forth. The relational context that Menkel-Meadow offers between domestic and
international is not the applicable construct for the formation of a general theory.
Instead, the relevant frame is between non-democratic and democratic political
systems and the difference between the concepts of conflict and dispute and their
attending institutional mechanisms. Menkel-Meadow's analysis is useful in sub-
defining the issues in the vast foliage of conflict resolution and dispute manage-
ment, yet blocks our vision of the forest and its demarcations.
The concept of this General Theory on Disputes and Conflicts will be dis-
missed by many colleagues and accepted by critics as a special theory at best.
However, it is offered here to highlight the political reality that the fields of
change and conflict management are now of critical importance in the execution
of national governmental and international policy, especially in the western or
northern countries and in the structuring of democratic societies, necessitating a
clear formulation that is useful to theorists and practitioners, policy and decision-
makers, and funders and international donors.
The General Theory on Disputes and Conflicts assigns disputes to transitional
and mature democracies and conflicts to authoritarian regimes. The First Premise
of the General Theory is that there are no conflicts in democratic society, only
disputes, as democracy transforms conflicts into dispute settlement mechanisms.
The Second Premise is that in authoritarian regimes there are only conflicts and
politicized systems of settlement, not disputes. The Third Premise is that in in-
ternational relations, national states can transform conflicts into disputes. In this
article, conflicts are defined as those issues that lack a legitimate, reliable, trans-
parent, non-arbitrary forum for the peaceful settlement of differences. Disputes,
conversely, are pre-described as having recognized forums for their expression
and resolution that meet the above criteria. In short, conflicts lack a viable "con-
tainer" for the routine management of differences.
*. Raymond Shonholtz, 1D. (University of California, Berkeley), is the president of Partners for
Democratic Change, an international organization of indigenous national centers on conflict manage-
ment in Argentina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.
1. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domes-
tic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319.
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11. THE FIRST PREMISE: THERE ARE No CONFLICTS IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY
Democratic society has a fundamental and constitutional responsibility to ad-
dress contentious issues peacefully. Democracy, by its very ideology, actively
promotes differences by encouraging diverse opinion, expression of ideas, forma-
tion of different political parties and groups, and the development of public poli-
cies that may be inimical to various (market or civil society) interests. 2 The de-
mocratic principles are now universally recognized as simply stated in the Pream-
ble to the United States Constitution: "We the people... to insure domestic Tran-
quility [and] ...promote the general Welfare. . . ,3 The people directly and
through their representatives have a constitutional obligation to promote the gen-
eral welfare and domestic tranquility.
Moreover, market economies, the economic engine of nearly all democracies,
promote creativity, competition, individualism, and aggregation of resources that
generate tensions and issues between competitors and non-market interests and
local, national, and international market forces. Democracy's experience with
capitalism demonstrates the need to develop, maintain, refine, and enforce a con-
sistent regulatory regime to manage the creative and monopolistic tendencies of
the market sector. In practice, the issues that the market sector generates require
mechanism and regimes of dispute management and settlement.
Examples of the interface of democratic principles and the transformation of
conflicts into disputes abound; two examples, resulting in powerful impacts on
American society can be seen in the field of labor-management. Following the
Pullman Railroad strike of 1894, new legislation creating collective bargaining
laws imposed the state's enforcement of labor-management issues on the conflict-
ing parties.4 In the United States today, there are labor issues but no labor con-
2. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes
stated:
While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.
Id See also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Judge Learned
Hand further explained, "[l]nterest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest pro-
tected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out
of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection." Id.
3. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
4. See Daniel W. Levy, A Legal History of Irrational Exuberance, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 799,
842-44 (1998); DAVID RAY PAPKE, THE PULLMAN CASE: THE CLASH OF LABOR AND CAPITAL IN
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 29-33 (1999). Pullman Palace Railroad Company lowered workers' wages
unilaterally twenty-five percent. Led by Eugene Debs and the American Railway Company, the work-
ers boycotted Pullman causing a transportation standstill in and out of Chicago. In reaction, the Presi-
dent ordered 2,000 federal troops to Chicago to restore order. Id.; David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure
Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155, 183 (2002). The Attorney General
sought and obtained an injunction in the federal circuit court against Debs and other union leaders to
cease further interference with the mails or railroads engaged in interstate commerce. Id. See also H.
David Kelly, Jr., An Argument for Retaining the Well Established Distinction Between Contractual and
Statutory Claims in Labor Arbitration, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 11 (1997) ("Congress decided to
pursue arbitration as the road to further labor peace and enacted the Erdman Act in 1898" (citing 30
Stat. 424 (1898) (repealed 1909)). Congress in turn passed such acts as the Clayton Act, and the Taft-
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flicts leading to violence and social disruption, as the antecedents for such actions
are now channeled into negotiation and settlement mechanisms. In California,
farm labor conflict was rampant in the early 1960s in the fields between the
United Farm Workers Union and growers.5 The State's passage in 1975 of the
Agricultural Labor Relations Act6 created a "container" for farm labor disputes,
non-existent before, legitimating labor grievances and providing a mechanism for
dispute management] There are disputes, but not conflicts, in California farm
labor-grower relationships.
In democratic society, the goal is to create through democratic processes,
policies, structures, and mechanisms, skilled personnel and enforcement proce-
dures for managing those issues that without such regimes would undermine the
constitutional obligation to maintain peace and tranquility.
New and evolving democracies face a more severe challenge, as the transition
from authoritarian to democratic rule brings into the open the historical and politi-
cal conditions that prevailed prior to the transition. In the transformation process,
citizens and government officials are likely to experience all the tensions and is-
sues suppressed during the authoritarian regime, as well as all the new issues cre-
ated during the transformation to democracy.8
The vast complexity of the democratization enterprise in evolving democra-
cies requires use of all the methodologies relevant to dispute management. Con-
trary to Menkel-Meadow's assumptions, anxieties and skepticism, 9 experience
teaches that advanced forms of dispute management do transfer well into evolving
democracies and are urgently needed in some cases.
The following examples highlight the contribution of transforming conflicts
into disputes and the establishment of policies and mechanisms of dispute man-
agement in evolving democracies:
Blood Feuds: Of historical dimension in Kosovo, blood feuds are now
subject to mediating processes.'0 This is contrary to Menkel-Meadow's
assertion that mediating models "will not work to achieve 'truth and rec-
onciliation.'"11
Title Claims: Mediating and arbitrating processes are applied in Kosovo
for the recognition and finalization of land title claims. Reclaiming and
restitution claims on homes previously owned before communist expro-
Hartley Act, which is also called the Labor Management Relations Act, among others. Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et. seq. (2000).
5. See Maria L. Ontiveros, New Perspectives on Labor and Gender: Lessons from the Fields:
Female Farmworkers and the Law, 55 ME. L. REV. 157, 172-75 (2003).
6. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (West 2003).
7. See Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should "Agricultural Laborers" Continue to be
Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 EMORY L. 489, 530 (1999); Ontiveros, supra
note 5, at 175.
8. See Raymond Shonholtz, The Role of Minorities in Establishing Mediating Norms and Institu-
tions in the New Democracies, 10 MEDIATION Q. 231 (1993) [hereinafter Shonholtz, The Role of
Minorities].
9. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 339.
10. Partners for Democratic Change, Partners - Kosovo, available at
http://www.partnersglobal.org/centers/centers-kosova.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
11. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 338.
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priation are settled in Central and Eastern Europe through agencies ap-
plying mediating processes.12
Privatization: Issues arising from the commercial and industrial transfer
of ownership from the state to new companies, owners, and individuals
are arbitrated and mediated in Central and Eastern Europe.' 
3
Labor Issues: Mediating processes are now applied to labor-management
disputes throughout Central Europe. 4
Market Promotion: Recognizing the need for dispute settlement to ad-
vance a viable market sector, the World Bank supports the creation of
commercial mediation and arbitration process (most recently in Alba-
nia). 5
Ethnic Conciliation: Diverse ethnic issues throughout Central and East-
em Europe are addressed increasingly through ethnic conciliation com-
missions, established through municipal resolutions or statutes.'
6
In all of these examples, Partners for Democratic Change 7 and the national
Partners' Center in each country have been the major designers, implementers,
and trainers for the new systems of dispute management. With nearly fifteen
years of experience, Partners' successful national Centers attest to the ability of
mediating processes to be successfully adapted and applied to the diverse and
critically important range of government, social, economic, and political issues
confronting all the evolving democracies. In each case, the historical conflicts,
long submerged or manipulated by authoritarian regimes, become opportunities to
12. United Nations Mission in Kosovo Administrative, UNMIK ADMINISTRATION OF TITLE CLAIMS
IN KOSOVO, at http://www.unmikonline.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
13. See, e.g., Polish Ministry of the Treasury, Direct Privatisation, at http://www.mst.gov.pl (de-
scribing the process of transferring ownership).
14. Polish and Hungarian labor laws are managed through the Ministry of Labor. See Michael
Albright, Note, Poland's 1991 Labor Statutes: A Refinement of Earlier Legislation Rather than a
Liberalization of Union Rights and Powers, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 571, 593 (1993); Orsolya
Farkas, Book Review: New Patterns of Collective Labour Law in Central Europe, Czech and Slovak
Republics, Hungary, Poland, Umberto Carabelli and Silvana Sciarra, Editors, 19 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 113, 114-15 (1997); Maria Okonska, Bibliography: Labor Law and Industrial Relations in
Central and Eastern Europe, 1989-1999: A Select Annotated Bibliography, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
983, 991 (2001); Jackie Ruff, Job Security in Poland: Economic Privatization Policy and Workplace
Protections, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. I, 2 at n.7 (1993); Tiziano Treu, General Report: Procedures
and Structures ofCollective Bargaining at the Enterprise and Plant Levels, 7 COMP. LAB. L. 219, 227-
28(1987).
15. See, Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Approves Two Credits for Albania (Mar. 21,
2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org.
16. I lana Shapiro, New Approaches to Old Problems: Lessons from an Ethnic Conciliation Project,
15 NEGOTIATION J. 149 (1999); Raymond Shonholtz, Guest Editor, Special Issue: Developing Mediat-
ing Processes in the New Democracies, 10 MEDIATION Q. 225 (1993).
17. Partners for Democratic Change is an international non-govemmental organization of independ-
ent, sustainable Centers on change and conflict management developed in evolving democracies. See
Partners for Democratic Change, Who We Are, at http://www.partnersglobal.org/wwa/wwa.html (last
visited Nov. -19, 2003).
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create new policies, structures, forums, and mechanisms for the management of
disputes, furthering social tranquility and demonstrating the value and efficacy of
democracy.
Ironically, in evolving democracies (as well as to a lesser degree in developed
democracies), conflictual conditions present an opportunity to create new policies,
institutions, mechanisms, professions, and administrations that transform such
conditions into manageable disputes. Conflictual conditions identify the immedi-
ate needs of the society and pinpoint areas requiring legislative attention. In de-
mocratic society, institutions are often established to redress inequities and imbal-
ances in the society, creating new channels for the management of disputes and a
new venue for policy-making. Strides to regulate capitalism in the United States
took place following the Great Depression, as the social and economic inequities
were increasingly apparent, and social and political conflict were feared. The
regulatory policy and scheme were initiated through the democratic governance
mechanisms of the society.' 8
Finally, extensive practice in the field does not confirm Menkel-Meadow's
many assertions that mediating processes will not work in other cultures.' 9 While
appropriately citing many concerns that I and others have had about the "transfer
of Americanized" methodologies, the creative, acculturated adaptation of methods
by in-country trainers and mediators has consistently addressed these issues. It
cannot be stressed enough how appropriately sensitive and successful they have
been in making mediating modalities work for deep-rooted conflict, 20 including
ethnic and national minority, 2' blood feuds, and indigenous issues.
22
From all the work in the field, from much innovation, development and ex-
perimentation, a holistic rule of law system design incorporating significant set-
tlement modalities can be articulated and integrated in the dispute management
structure of democratic societies. 23 Partners for Democratic Change and the na-
tional Partners' independent Centers operating in eleven developing democracies
24
have promoted the design and its elements through seminars and training initia-
tives.
18. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 159 (2000). See also Don Adams & Arlene Gold-
bard, New Deal Cultural Programs: Experiments in Cultural Democracy, at
http://www.wwcd.org/policy/US/newdeal.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003) ("The largest and most
important of the New Deal cultural programs was the Works Progress Administration (WPA), a mas-
sive employment relief program" that put the unemployed back to work in jobs which would serve the
public good and conserve the skills and the self-esteem of workers throughout the United States).
19. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at (around footnote 98). See generally Shonholtz, The Role of
Minorities, supra note 8; Joseph B. Stulberg, Cultural Diversity and Democratic Institutions: What
Role for Negotiations?, 10 MEDIATION Q. 249 (1999); Susan T. Wildau et al., Developing Democratic
Decision-Making and Dispute Resolution Procedures Abroad, 10 MEDIATION Q. 303 (1993).
20. Randa Slim & Harold H. Saunders, Dialogue to Change Conflictual Relationships, in HIGHER
EDUCATION EXCHANGE 43 (1994).
21. Partners for Democratic Change, Report to USAID on Bulgaria (unpublished report) (on file
with author).
22. Partners-Argentina, Report to the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 2002 (unpublished
report) (on file with author).
23. See infra, at Appendix.
24. Partners for Democratic Change have centers located in Argentina, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Kosovo, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Partners for Democ-
ratic Change, Centers, http://www.partnersglobal.org/centers/centers.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
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Even when there are no immediate or clear institutionalized processes or fo-
rums to bring people together to define and address issues or to take action, the
tension that may emerge is generally sporadic and channeled into new or estab-
lished forums, especially if violence occurs.25 Accordingly, in democratic society
there are no conflicts, only issues awaiting policies and forums for the manage-
ment of disputes.
III. THE SECOND PREMISE: THERE ARE ONLY CONFLICTS AND
POLITICIZED SYSTEMS OF SETTLEMENT IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Under authoritarian regimes, issues are treated as conflicts because they are
managed through forms of repression, violence, avoidance, or ideology. More-
over, existing settlement mechanisms are always subject to political influence and
accordingly politicized depending on the parties, issues, and regime's interests.
While democratic forums are designed to resolve differences peacefully, systems
established by authoritarian regimes are, by design, subject to external influence,
manipulation, and suppression of issues.
Authoritarian regimes are sensitive to all issues that relate to their power and
control. For these reasons they intervene, and thereby politicize, settlement proc-
esses, recognizing that the expression of issues and methods of resolution are
inherently political and have regime consequences. Lacking forums for open
dialogue or "open space" for the exchange of political ideas, nearly every critical
comment is a perceived threat to an authoritarian regime and the society it creates.
While, in democratic rule of law systems, some disputes may have a political
dimension, rarely does an issue threaten the efficacy of the foundation of govern-
ment.
26
This distinction in the management of issues and differences needs to be
taken into account when designing rule of law systems. In the transformation to
democracy, it becomes apparent that during the authoritarian regime there has
been distortion, corruption, and atrophy in the judicial mechanisms for the man-
agement of issues and a corresponding psychological mistrust within the citizenry
in state instruments of resolution.
When embracing the issues of repression and the new conditions raised dur-
ing the transformation to democracy (acceptable discourse, privatization, property
title, employment security, unionism, etc.), democratic governance is forced to
immediately establish public policies and corresponding systems that can address
the previously suppressed issues of social and economic justice, as well as create
systems that transform the state from one political and economic entity into an-
other. This is an overwhelming challenge during the transformation process, as
citizens and government officials are likely to experience all the tensions and is-
25. See Robert Ricigliano et. al., Problems Without A Process: Using an Action Dialogue to Manage
Racial Tensions, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83 (1999).
26. Contra Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superceded by U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII, XIV.
The infamous Dred Scott decision is an exception to this rule. States, disinclined to implement the
Supreme Court's decision, challenged the federal government's enforcement mechanism. "Dred Scott,
in retrospect, demonstrated how much the tacit legitimacy of the principle ofjudicial supremacy rested
on a prudent exercise of the principle of departmental discretion." G. Edward White, The Constitu-
tionalJourneyofMarbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1510 (2003).
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sues suppressed during the authoritarian regime, as well as all the new issues that
are created during the transformation to democracy.
Thus development of policies, systems, and processes for the management of
disputes requires not only new mechanisms in democratic society but also the
psychological transformation of how citizens and government officials embrace
the difference between conflicts and disputes.
Ethnic issues in Central and Eastern Europe provide a good example of au-
thoritarian regime repression and the complexity of change during the transforma-
tion to democratic rule. In the course of developing Ethnic Conciliation Commis-
sions in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, Partners for Democ-
ratic Change encountered substantial unease at the municipal and national levels,
within the leadership of the new democratic parties, and academic circles when
addressing ethnic issues.27 Finding no political advantage, few governmental
officials, institutions, or prominent individuals wanted to create policies or forums
to address Roma, Pomak [Moslemized Bulgarians], Jewish, or other minority
interests and long standing social justice issues. During the authoritarian period,
manipulation and repression were the operative tools for managing minority group
issues; the authenticity and expression of minority concerns had no forum.
Conciliation Commissions operating as new public forums supported by mu-
nicipal public policy challenged authoritarian methods and provided a unique
opportunity for municipalities to better understand and address issues. Moreover,
conciliating-designed commissions are new structures that frame the forum-of-
dialogue, strengthening the voice of minorities and creating policy-based struc-
tures on on-going dialogue. However, it was not until many of the Central Euro-
pean governments realized that structurally addressing minority issues was critical
to the European Union's accession process that Partners' Conciliation Commis-
sions became more accepted. Seeking inclusion in a democratic venue, the Euro-
pean Union served as a catalyst for new municipal democratic structures and
norms.
To survive, authoritarian regimes must suppress issues that challenge the
state. When the state declines to provide potential challengers a negotiating table
or an institutional structure for dialogue and open exchange on policy,28 the cor-
ruption of institutional mechanisms for the management of differences may be an
effect. Regardless of the professionalization of the magistrates, the education of
the professionals, or the expectations of external entities (e.g. EU), authoritarian
regimes will corrupt justice structures because they are integral to the maintenance
of regime control. This was true in colonial periods, as a primary factor in colonial
governance was the imposition of colonial justice over indigenous systems. 29
27. 1 interviewed political leaders in Central Europe in 1992-1993 in the course of seeking support
for implementing local ethnic conciliation commissions. This was part of an effort to implement the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's 1992 Geneva Recommendations on the rights
and status of minorities. I served as a member of the official US delegation to the Conference. 33
I.L.M. 1625 (1994).
28. In the Soviet Union such challengers were labeled "dissidents" and sent to the Gulags, or
"crazy" and sent to the asylums.
29. See Robert B. Porter, Pursuing the Path of tndigenization in the Era of Emergent International
Law Governing the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 123 (2002); Gerry J.
Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 255 (1996).
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Conflict management is a governance issue, but few regimes delegate this func-
tion to independent judiciaries.
In the transition to democracy, it is difficult to create a wholly credible justice
system "out of the head of Zeus," even when there are adequate funds. Creating a
modem justice system requires more than money, it also requires time. This is the
one factor that is most lacking in establishing a democratic- and market-based
society. Accordingly, rule of law systems need to be conceptually designed in a
holistic manner. This can be accomplished by incorporating direct negotiation,
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration, along with a judicial settlement process,
as the former mechanisms are easier to establish, acculturate, and apply. Merely
waiting for the creation and operation of judicial settlement processes thwarts the
development of local dispute mechanisms and atrophies the opportunity to create
specific forums [e.g., labor-management, ethnic commissions, environmental
collaboratives, etc.] that are needed to move conflicts to disputes and advance
settlement methodologies. For example, recognizing that viable market systems
need dispute settlement mechanisms to function, the World Bank supported the
development of a commercial mediation and arbitration system in Albania in
2000, along with funding magistrate schools to train judges to address the corrup-
tion of the state's judicial system.30 I concur with Menkel-Meadow that "'exoge-
nously' created institutions" lack institutional roots and can float like lotus plants
in evolving democracies. Nonetheless, with close attention to culture, national
needs, and structural design, it is very possible to achieve successful mediating
modalities while more formal rule of law systems are being developed. We see
this in labor-management collective bargaining, as well as in the commercial and
family law sectors, throughout Central and Eastern Europe. 3 1 In Latin America,
and especially Argentina, mediating and change management32 (citizen participa-
tion processes) have taken root and are applied to a broad range of civil and envi-
ronmental issues even while the country is in a dire political and economic condi-
tion. Ironically, many of Menkel-Meadow critiques are Americanized "exports"
on processes that have been acculturated and adapted in foreign lands. 33 Nonethe-
less, adapted models do not necessarily overcome concerns inherent in the nature
of informal and formal settlement processes [power imbalance, gender inequality,
30. See supra note 15.
3 I. For a general discussion of ADR programs in Europe, see llano Shapiro, Beyond Modernization:
Conflict Resolution in Central and Eastern Europe, 552 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 14, 24
(1997). See also Martin Wright, Key Questions on Victim-Offender Mediation, in JUVENILE
OFFENDER-VICTIM MEDIATION 125 (Beata Czamecka-Dzialuk & Dobroncha Wojcik eds., 2002),
available at http://www.restorativejustice.org/asp/ listingSummary.asp?ID=2721 (last visited Nov. 19,
2003). Prior to 1989, there were no labor, commercial, family or criminal justice mediators and arbi-
trators. In 1997, Poland enacted legislation to mediate juvenile justice cases. Id. Poland, in 1991, and
Hungary, in 1993, enacted labor mediation legislation. Furthermore, school mediation is not a part of
the Czech Republic's educational system. Polish law governing the resolution of collective bargaining
disputes can be found at http://www.prawo.org.pl/prawo/clcf/statutes/stat40.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2003).
32. Partners-Argentina was organized to promote citizen participation and change management
processes in Argentina and in Latin America. The Center has pioneered the practice in environmental,
land use, crime prevention, and decentralization of the judicial system. See Partners for Democratic
Change - Partners-Argentina, at http://www.partnersglobal.org/centers/centers-argentina.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2003).
33. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 339.
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class and ethnicity issues, etc.] and require the close attention of practitioners and
policy makers in each country.
Evolving democracies have the heavy burden of undoing the pervasive cor-
ruption sponsored by an authoritarian regime's practice of suppressing issues and
manipulating conflict. Substantial time and innovation are required to establish
authentic dispute settlement policies, forums, and mechanisms, as well as to gar-
ner the support of the citizenry. The incorporation of learning from distant shores
does not, of itself, de-legitimate the contribution, provided that in-country profes-
sionals are experimenting and learning how to acculturate the processes to best
meet local needs. Partners' Centers have created a new profession of mediators,
negotiators, facilitators, and trainers, many of whom have adapted processes, in-
fluenced legislation, built firms, and expanded the application of the methodolo-
gies well beyond the learning that came from another country.34 In each case,
practitioners and policy makers relate the work to the context of the country's
political history, seeking to use transparent and more empowering methodologies
to overcome a legacy of conflict politicalization, institutional corruption, and citi-
zen weariness.
35
IV. THE THIRD PREMISE: THERE ARE ONLY CONFLICTS IN INTER-STATE
RELATIONS AWAITING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS
Nation states live in a "Hobbesian world' 36 and to many, this is more true to-
day than anytime in the last fifty years. Nation states are always in a state of
inter-state conflict unless they create policies (treaties) that transform all or com-
ponents of a conflict into a dispute management system.37 Conflicts create the
opportunity to "democratize" issues by limiting state power to an international
regime or agreement prescribing how future matters will be settled.38 Creating
"third" mechanisms outside the full control of the parties, serves to limit state
unilateralism and independence and fosters an international dispute settlement
34. Partners for Democratic Change, Case Studies, at http://www.partnersglobal.org/wwd/
impactlaw.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
35. Raymond Shonholtz, Strengthening Transitional Democracies Through Conflict Resolution:
Conflict Resolution Education, Training, and Global Development: The Mediating Future 552
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 139, 141 (1997) [hereinafter Shonholtz, Strengthening Transi-
tional Democracies]. Emerging democracies' perspectives will be useful in designing "similar modali-
ties" for use at international level. Id.
36. As defined by Blake D. Morant, "A Hobbesian view of natural law dictated that individuals will
employ any means, including violence, to attain and defend power, possessions, and reputation."
Blake Morant, Teaching of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Conflict Theory: An Intriguing Compari-
son, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 86 (1998).
37. The World Trade Organization has an arbitrating methodology for trade disputes placed before it
by member states called the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
ICSID, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
38. As described in an earlier article:
All conflicts in a democracy are acceptable provided that they are peacefully expressed and re-
solved. Democracy circumscribes a large acceptable boundary around conflict, recognizing that
conflict is one of its most constructive engines for organizing; unifying opinion; crating opposi-
tion; and expressing value, truth, and understanding. In the context of Western democracies,
conflict has positive value. Democracy's perennial mission is the creation of acceptable, fair, and
neutral venues and forums for the peaceful expression of conflict.
Shonholtz, Strengthening Transitional Democracies, supra note 35, at 140.
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construct that contains the conflict, transfers authority, and promotes conflict pre-
vention through agreed upon dispute settlement procedures. These are often
small, but critical steps in democratizing conflicts by creating new independent
governance structures around their settlement beyond the full control of the par-
ties. As the management of inter-nation conflict is a state governance issue, so is
the delegation of settlement processes.
In the post-World War II era, an innovative range of institutions and mecha-
nisms was created to contain and define potential disputes and to create judicial
and mediating modalities to address them. 39 In short, anticipating conflict, nation
states have created bilateral (trade), regional (security, trade, and finance), and
international (finance, trade, security, environmental, etc.) forums and mecha-
nisms, generally sector specific, to channel issues into settlement proceedings.
Many of the settlement processes have inherent problems (power imbalances,
resource unevenness, political influence, etc.) that arise in the process. Nonethe-
less, it is better to have a process that manages conflicts as disputes, as such
mechanisms through experience and practice can correct, refine, and improve.
Lacking such mechanisms entirely reduces all issues to conflicts and ad hoc set-
tlement processes, which are more dangerous, costly and time consuming.
While the exception may be the European Union, International Criminal
Court, and World Trade Organization, which can initiate as well as resolve issues
defined as international, historically and generally today, there are no "interna-
tional" conflicts or disputes, only nation-states that have issues with one another.
While international policy bodies (UN, OAS, etc.) or non-government organiza-
tions (Greenpeace, Amnesty International, etc.) may spotlight issues, decision-
makers most often are nation-state leaders (UN may debate, but in the end, na-
tional actors decide). Decision-makers may decline internationalizing a dispute
settlement regime (United States as regards the International Criminal Count) or
they may endorse a global regime (as with the WTO for trade), but what makes an
issue "international" are nation-state actors.
Menkel-Meadow uses international conflicts and disputes without significant
distinction in her paper.40 This confuses the matter. There are only conflicts
within the international sphere that nation-state actors agree to transform into
disputes for their orderly management and settlement. Lacking this mature devel-
opment, conflicts are subject to ad hoc negotiation and settlement processes.
Without the introduction of ad hoc processes, conflict is open to violence and
settlement methods by force or power persuasion.
In making order within the international sphere, nation-states have recognized
the importance of creating and maintaining institutions and protocols for issues
they anticipate requiring settlement. Proactive dispute settlement institution build-
ing has been a great hallmark of the past fifty years and can be seen in nearly
every subject sector [health, environment, commerce, trafficking, human rights,
war crimes, drug enforcement, etc.]. The progressive position would be to "out-
39. Examples include the United Nations, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the
United States Institute of Peace. See generally Andrea Leahy, United Nations Mediation of Regional
Crises, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 135 (1986); Andrea Strimling, The Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service: A Partner in International Conflict Prevention, 2 PEPP. DiSp. RESOL. L.J.
417 (2002).
40. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1.
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law" conflict and allow for only the peaceful expression and resolution of differ-
ences through dispute settlement mechanisms. Whether the United States, as the
world's most powerful country, will subscribe to the concept that the forced set-
tlement of conflict is unacceptable and "illegal" and that permanent or ad hoc
dispute settlement processes must be employed will, to a significant degree, de-
cide the pace and development of the global banning of conflict and the interna-
tionalization and democratization of dispute settlement forums and mechanisms.
Interestingly, both the Atlantic Charter of 194 141 and the UN Charter 42 underscore
these principles.
In the past fifty years, there has been an evolution in thinking about transna-
tional issues, finding commonality in democratic values, security, finance, popula-
tion movement, and commerce, as well as many others, across national borders.
The increased democratization of conflict through institutionalized dispute settle-
ment mechanisms reduces the propensity for international conflict and violence.
Each time national state actors delegate to an international regime authority to
manage disputes, the arena for conflict diminishes. Accordingly, we want to iden-
tify conflict early, define its perimeters and create forums and mechanisms for its
management. The International Criminal Court4 3 is a good example of this proc-
ess, removing the obligation to create ad hoc "war crimes" courts or tribunals and
making it possible to establish a body of international criminal law based on trea-
ties, protocols, and case law, known a priori to would-be war crimes violators.
The increased intersection of nation-state actors in delegating authority to in-
ternational forums to corral conflict through dispute settlement mechanisms builds
stronger relationships between the states on common issues, decreasing the likeli-
hood of violent conflict or war between them. The normative statement of this
position is that "democracies do not war with one another."
The near equivalent of this value can be seen in the complex forms of rela-
tionship building between nations in security (NATO), union formation (United
States; European Union; OSCE), broad economic alliances (WTO; European
monetary system), and regional trade mechanisms (NAFTA; Mercosur). All of
these arrangements generate disputes, not conflicts, and are resolved through
agreed upon mechanisms.
While authoritarian states exist in the twenty-first century and their people
need the values that an acculturated democracy can bring, the most critical devel-
opment for the reduction of conflict lies in the international sphere. The more
nation states devolve to international forums the governance of conflict, the more
authoritarian regimes, as well as democratic, will experience the pressure domes-
tically and internationally to acquiesce to international dispute settlement norms,
forums, and processes.
41. ATLANTIC CHARTER, Aug. 14, 1941, 3 Bevans 686.
42. U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1153.
43. The International Criminal Court is a prospective institution designed to define the rules and
procedures and create the institution for the criminal prosecution of those charged with genocide and
other crimes against humanity. See generally THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl
Kaysen eds., 2000). See also The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, at
http://www.iccnow.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
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It is within these forums that many of Menkel-Meadow's concerns about
BATNAs, enforcement mechanisms, power, contextual issues, etc., will have an
operative sphere within which to be effectively addressed and improved upon over
time.
V. CONCLUSION
While everyday realities offer exceptions to the General Theory, in its theo-
retical form, the goal in democratic society is to transform all conflicts into man-
ageable disputes; conflicts, especially those that are potentially violent, lacking a
container for their management, manifest in democratic society a domain of activ-
ity requiring the formation of new policies, institutions, and dispute management
systems and mechanisms.
No authoritarian society can consistently and successfully contain and repress
conflict. Like weeds through concrete, human issues will surface; if the state will
not offer a credible forum, the state will not survive, so powerful are human con-
flicts, especially those relating to freedom.
In the international sphere, nation states need to take on the obligation of di-
minishing conflict through institutionalized mechanisms in order to create a world
that is more just, fair and sensitive to the great diversity of humankind and the
demands of the environmental world that we live in. In promoting this interna-
tional perspective of conflict, practitioners and theorists in the field of change and
dispute management need to build a domestic constituency for this international
obligation, educating and pressing national policy makers to appreciate the global
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VI. APPENDIX
Conflict Management Models
UNDER RULE OF LAW
Business I Business Civil
Int'l Relations Community) Labor Mgm't Labor Mgm't Family
Corporate Criminal
SOURCE: PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
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